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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Stevens once described the Internet with its many attributes as
a “unique medium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no
particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the
world, with access to [it].”1 A vast array of interconnected computers,2
* J.D. 2001, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. History 1992,
University of Florida. The author would like to thank Mike, Chris, and Kate for their
continuing love and understanding throughout her academic career.
1. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
2. Due to the nature of the beast, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say with any
accuracy just how many people or computers are online. Indeed, “[t]he art of estimating
how many are online throughout the world is an inexact one at best.” Nua Internet
Surveys, How Many Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.
html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). A February 2002 “guesstimate” by Nua put the number
at 544.2 million users worldwide. Id. In the United States alone, Nua estimates that
there are approximately 164.1 million users, almost sixty percent of the population. Nua
Internet Surveys, U.S. & Canada, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/n_
america.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002).
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the Internet is incapable of precise geographic definition. Indeed, “[t]he
Internet has no territorial boundaries. . . . [A]s far as the Internet is
concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is
everywhere where there is Internet access.”3 In a world where legal
boundaries are often defined by physical ones, courts are increasingly
faced with the challenge of applying traditional rules to new and unique
technologies. For example, courts have recently been forced to grapple
with the following question: when may a court exercise jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant based on his Internet contacts?4
In August 2001, a California court addressed this issue for the first
time in Pavlovich v. Superior Court,5 when a Web site operator,
Matthew Pavlovich, sought to quash service of process on the basis of
lack of jurisdiction.6 Despite the apparent lack of any contacts with the
State of California,7 the court held that exercise of personal jurisdiction
was supported by minimum contacts.8
This Casenote questions the Pavlovich court’s holding.9 More
3. Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997).
4. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Bensusan
Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also Jeremy Gilman, Personal Jurisdiction and
the Internet: Traditional Jurisprudence for a New Medium, 56 BUS. LAW. 395 (2000)
(surveying recent Internet personal jurisdiction cases); James A. Huizanga & John K.
VanDeWeert, Personal Jurisdiction over Internet Defendants, in PRACTISING LAW INST.,
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 1241: CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 11 (2001) (surveying cases dealing with the issue of
personal jurisdiction and Internet defendants), available at WL 1241 PLI/CORP 11.
5. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g granted, Pavlovich v. Superior
Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001). In December 2001 the California Supreme Court
granted review of the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision. This Casenote suggests
that the jurisdictional analysis in Pavlovich is flawed and that the supreme court should
take this opportunity not only to overrule the lower court’s decision, but also to set forth
the appropriate guidelines for Internet jurisdiction under California law.
6. Id. at 911.
7. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
8. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916.
9. This Casenote is meant as a critique of one Internet jurisdiction case,
Pavlovich v. Superior Court. Id. It is not meant to be an extensive commentary on the
issue of personal jurisdiction and the Internet. Furthermore, it does not seek to answer
the difficult question of when the exercise of jurisdiction over an Internet defendant is
reasonable; that subject is beyond the scope of this Casenote. For more on Internet
jurisdiction, see generally Joseph S. Burns & Richard A. Bales, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Web, 53 ME. L. REV. 29 (2001) (examining ways that courts have tried to resolve
personal jurisdiction issues based on Internet activity); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine
and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional
Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 609 (1998) (positing that personal jurisdiction
inquiries related to the Internet should be based on state interests and procedural
fairness); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 438–40 (1998) (suggesting that courts
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specifically, it argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this
case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and that the court erred when it failed to
quash service of process. Further, this Casenote posits that exercise of
jurisdiction here not only eviscerates the mandates of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington10 and its progeny, but also extends California
jurisdiction to cover Internet users everywhere.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: AN OVERVIEW
Personal jurisdiction is one of the cornerstones of the American legal
system, and the initial concern in most cases, for if a court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, a case cannot go forward.11
Personal jurisdiction concerns a court’s ability to exercise power over a
nonresident defendant.12 Absent personal jurisdiction, a nonresident
defendant cannot be haled into a foreign court and forced to defend an
action.13
Personal jurisdiction is a constitutional requirement, flowing from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which forbids “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”14 The Due Process Clause seeks
should focus more on the burden of defending suits in distant forums and on
foreseeability of suit in that forum); Adam Cizek, Comment, Traditional Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Does It Work?, 7 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109 (1999)
(addressing whether questions of jurisdiction and the Internet are amenable to the
traditional analysis); Richard Philip Rollo, Casenote, The Morass of Internet Personal
Jurisdiction: It Is Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667 (1999) (discussing the
current approaches to personal jurisdiction over Internet defendants).
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. This Casenote is not meant to serve as an exhaustive dissertation on the law of
personal jurisdiction. Instead, it provides a brief overview as background. For a more
thorough treatment of personal jurisdiction, see generally ROBERT C. CASAD,
JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION (2d ed. 2001); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 26 (3d ed. 1997).
12. For purposes of this Casenote, the discussion of personal jurisdiction is limited
to nonresident defendants. If the defendant is a resident of a state or domiciled therein,
the state may exercise jurisdiction over him. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–
64 (1940).
13. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Personal jurisdiction has both statutory and
constitutional limits. Therefore, every personal jurisdiction inquiry necessarily requires
that two questions be answered. First, is the court statutorily authorized to exercise
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant? Second, if there is a state statute, is the
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to ensure “that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”15
Thus, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if
“he [has] certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”16 Due Process is satisfied when two criteria are
satisfied—first, the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the
forum, and second, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.17
As stated, the threshold question for personal jurisdiction is whether
the defendant had contacts with the forum state. The nature and quantity
exercise of personal jurisdiction constitutional according to the facts of the case? Courts
may not exercise jurisdiction over a person unless they have been empowered to do so.
The legislature of each state must grant its courts power to exercise jurisdiction. Where,
as here, a state wants to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, it will
generally enact a “long arm statute.” In California, courts are authorized to “exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of [California] or of the
United States.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2000). Consequently, in
California, personal jurisdiction inquiries are, in essence, collapsed into one question: is
the court’s exercise of jurisdiction constitutional? See Sibley v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d
322, 324 (Cal. 1976) (“This section [410.10] manifests an intent to exercise the broadest
possible jurisdiction, limited only by constitutional considerations.”).
15. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(stating further that the Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”).
16. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). International Shoe signaled a significant turning
point in personal jurisdiction analysis. Prior to the landmark case, actual physical
presence of the defendant in the forum was required. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
733–34 (1877). Physical presence remains a constitutional basis for exercising
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant; thus, if a nonresident defendant is present in
the forum state, he may be “tagged” and forced to defend a suit there. See Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–12 (1990).
Ostensibly wishing to base their exercise of personal jurisdiction on physical presence,
the Pavlovich court stated:
Instant access provided by the Internet is the functional equivalent of personal
presence of the person posting the material on the Web at the place from which
the posted material is accessed and appropriated. It is as if the poster is
instantaneously present in different places at the same time, and
simultaneously delivering his material at those different places. In a sense,
therefore, the reach of the Internet is also the reach of the extension of the
poster’s presence.
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 916 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g granted,
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001). One can only guess what the
court was getting at. Apparently the court realized the folly of this line of reasoning and
quickly abandoned it.
17. The issue may be analyzed in the following two steps: (1) are there minimum
contacts, and (2) if so, is the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable? See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–76 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286.
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of the contacts will determine whether the court may exercise either
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.18 Where the defendant’s contacts with the forum are
continuous and systematic, the court may exercise general jurisdiction
over the defendant for lawsuits wholly unrelated to the forum contacts.19
In other words, the defendant may be haled into the forum court to
answer for any matter, whether or not it relates to his contacts in the
state.20
Where, as in the case at hand,21 a defendant’s contacts with the forum
are not continuous and systematic, then the court may not exercise
general jurisdiction over the defendant. In this situation, the court must
determine whether the defendant’s contacts are of sufficient nature and
quality to establish specific jurisdiction, whereby the defendant may be
haled into the forum court to answer only for claims arising out of or
related to those contacts.22
Recall that the Due Process Clause requires that the defendant “should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”23 For this reason, a
defendant may not be forced to defend a suit arising out of random,
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, nor will a defendant be forced to defend
a suit arising out of the unilateral activity of another.24 Where, however,
the defendant has “‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the
forum”25 or “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
18. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16
(1984) (approving of and adopting the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction).
19. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (discussing the concept of general
jurisdiction); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414. For more
on general jurisdiction, see B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 1097 (1990); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 610 (1988). Note that in the case at hand, Pavlovich’s contacts with California
were anything but continuous and systematic. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying
text.
20. Note that if the lawsuit does not arise out of the contacts, the court will
exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant; on the other hand, if the lawsuit does
arise out of the defendant’s contacts, then the court will exercise specific jurisdiction
over the defendant. See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. To the defendant, the
distinction is, arguably, irrelevant. Either way, he is forced to defend the suit.
21. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414.
23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
24. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
25. Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
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protections of its laws,”26 exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible.
As noted, the threshold question for personal jurisdiction is whether
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state.27 In addition,
the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”28 Thus, where minimum contacts exist, an
exercise of personal jurisdiction may still be impermissible if it is
unreasonable or unfair.29 Reasonableness is assessed by weighing
several factors, including “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.’”30
In summary, specific personal jurisdiction is permissible if the
following three criteria are satisfied: (1) the defendant must have
purposefully directed his activities at the forum or purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum, (2) the suit must
arise out of or relate to those activities, and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction must be reasonable.
III. THE PAVLOVICH DECISION
A. The Factual Background
On December 27, 1999, DVD Copy Control Association (DVD CCA)
sued Matthew Pavlovich for misappropriation of trade secrets.31 While a
computer engineering student at Purdue University, Matthew Pavlovich,
along with several other defendants, “developed and/or posted computer
programs on the Internet.”32 One of the programs posted by Pavlovich
was DeCSS—a program designed to decrypt DVD CCA’s Content

26. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
(striking down exercise of jurisdiction as unreasonable, despite being unable to reach a
majority on the question of minimum contacts). In California, once minimum contacts
have been established, the court will presume that the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable. See Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Cal. 1996). At
that point, the defendant bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id.
30. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
31. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g
granted, Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001).
32. Id.
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Scramble System (CSS), which prevents DVDs from being copied.33
DeCSS was developed by reverse engineering CCS algorithms,34 which
DVD CCA alleged constituted a misappropriation of its trade secrets.35
The program itself was not written or published by Pavlovich; however,
he was aware of the reverse engineering and knew it was unauthorized.36
Despite this knowledge, Pavlovich posted DeCSS to the Internet,
thereby disseminating DVD CCA’s trade secrets.37
At the time Pavlovich posted DeCSS to the Internet, he was a student
at Purdue University in Indiana.38 He did not live or work in California.39
Furthermore, he “never: solicited business in California; designated a
registered agent for service of process in California; maintained a place
of business in California . . . or even visited California for any business
purpose.”40 In short, Pavlovich himself had no connection to California.
33. Id. The Content Scramble System is used to protect copyrighted material on
DVDs. In other words, if a DVD contains a movie, which is copyrighted material, the
Content Scramble System prevents the copying of that movie. See id. DeCSS was
created and originally posted to the Internet by a Norwegian teenager. See DVD Group
Must Show Why Jurisdiction Exists Over Defendant in DeCSS Case, 2 ANDREWS E-BUS.
L. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, WL 2 No. 4 ANEBUSLB 1.
34. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.
35. Id. Note that California law specifically permits reverse engineering. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 1997). However, DVD CCA argued that because use of
their software was subject to an agreement not to reverse engineer it, doing so
constituted a misappropriation of trade secrets. See Evan Hansen, Hollywood Dealt
Setback in DVD Code Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 14, 2000, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-249956.html?legacy=cnet.
36. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912. In a deposition, Pavlovich stated:
They had to reverse engineer those algorithms in order to mimic them. Like
just kind of quick once over, when you are reverse engineering something, you
see what goes in and what comes out, and if you don’t have access to that
information, what one would do is try to mimic those, so they wouldn’t
necessarily be the exact algorithms, but if you can get as close or if you can get
the correct results, then the engineering—reverse engineering process can be
deemed a success.
Id.
37. Id.
Pavlovich posted the program on a Web site called “livid.on.
openprojects.net.” Id. According to the court, Pavlovich owned and operated this site.
Id. Pavlovich maintained that he did not own it, but did concede that he posted DeCSS
on it. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of
Mandate, Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 2001) (No. CV
786804), available at http://cryptome.org/dvd-v-521-pqa.htm [hereinafter Points and
Authorities]. Though not addressed in the opinion itself, one may assume that the court
found no merit to this contention.
38. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
39. Points and Authorities, supra note 37.
40. Id.
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Pavlovich posted the program on a Web site that he owned and
operated, www.livid.on.openprojects.net.41 The Web site itself was a
passive site and “did not involve the interactive exchange of information
with users, did not solicit or engage in business activities, and did not
solicit contact with California.”42 In short, all Pavlovich did was upload
a program onto the Internet.
It was this action that formed the basis for DVD CCA’s December
1999 complaint. According to the complaint, Pavlovich misappropriated
trade secrets belonging to DVD CCA by republishing DeCSS on his
Web site.43 In response to the complaint, Pavlovich moved to quash
service of process on the grounds that the California court lacked
personal jurisdiction.44 Specifically, Pavlovich argued that he did not
have sufficient contacts with California to support the exercise of
jurisdiction.45 The issue wound its way through the California court
system46 and finally landed in the Sixth District Court of Appeal.
41. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912. See discussion supra note 37.
42. Points and Authorities, supra note 37.
43. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. Note that this Casenote deals only with
the issue of personal jurisdiction. The merits, or lack thereof, of DVD CCA’s complaint
are beyond the scope of this Casenote. For more information on the law of trade secrets
and the Internet, see generally Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: A
Practical Perspective, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1997, at 6 (suggesting practical ways to
avoid disclosure of trade secrets on the Internet and the legal consequences of
disclosure); Ari B. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51 (1998) (addressing trade secret law as it applies to the
Internet); Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for
Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317 (1999) (discussing both
equitable and legal remedies for disclosure of trade secrets on the Internet); David G.
Majdali, Comment, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet: Can Trade Secret Protection
Survive in the Internet Age?, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 125 (2000) (examining how courts
deal with dissemination of trade secrets on the Internet); Matthew R. Millikin, Note,
www.misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the
Internet, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (2000) (discussing trade secret protection and the
Internet).
44. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
45. Id.
46. On June 6, 2000, Pavlovich filed a motion to quash service of process in the
Santa Clara County Superior Court; the motion was denied. Id. at 909, 911. On
September 11, 2000, Pavlovich filed a petition in the Sixth District Court of Appeal for a
writ of mandate to compel the trial court to quash service of process due to lack of
personal jurisdiction; the petition was denied. Id. On October 23, 2000, Pavlovich filed
a petition with the California Supreme Court for review. Id. at 911. The Supreme Court
granted review and transferred the case back to the Sixth District Court of Appeal with
directions that the Court of Appeal vacate its denial and direct the superior court to show
cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted. Id.
The high court’s decision order was met with approval and described by some as a
“victory for civil liberties on the Net.” Electronic Frontier Found., Supreme Court
Thwarts Hollywood’s War on Cyberspace, at http://www.virtualrecordings.com/
pavrelease.htm (Dec. 15, 2000). Pavlovich’s attorney, Allonn Levy, stated that the
decision “re-affirmed the principle that you don’t lose your [c]onstitutional due process
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B. The Holding
After months of being bounced around the California courts, Matthew
Pavlovich’s motion to quash found itself before the Sixth District Court
of Appeal.47 Noting the reach of California’s long-arm statute, the court
held that, despite “Pavlovich’s lack of physical and personal presence in
California,”48 exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional. The court
reasoned that Pavlovich knew that California was the home of the movie
industry and a technology “hot spot.”49 As a result of that knowledge,
Pavlovich knew, or should have known, that his activities—republishing
a program meant to decrypt DVD CCA’s DeCSS—“while benefiting
him, were injuriously affecting the motion picture and computer
industries in California.”50 According to the court, this knowledge
provided a sufficient showing of “purposeful availment.” Furthermore,
the court found that exercise of jurisdiction over Pavlovich was not
unreasonable.51
C. Analysis
As stated, the Sixth District Court of Appeal found the exercise of
jurisdiction over Pavlovich constitutionally permissible. While the court
attempted to provide some rationale for its decision, its analysis is
unpersuasive and, arguably, erroneous.
rights when you enter cyberspace.” Id.
Pursuant to the supreme court’s order, the court of appeals vacated its order and
directed the superior court to show cause why Pavlovich’s motion should not be granted.
Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. The opinion at issue in this Casenote is the result of
that order. The superior court’s role in formulating the response to that order was likely
quite limited. As the real party in interest, DVD CCA filed a return in opposition to the
petition. Id.
Note that the California rules for appellate review differ substantially from the federal
rules. In federal court, a defendant may not seek immediate review of an order denying a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. As a general rule, he must wait until
the district court enters a final judgment. This stems from the fact that the federal courts
of appeal have “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). On the other hand, in California a defendant may seek
interlocutory appellate review. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 418.10(c) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2002). For more on California civil procedure, see WALTER W. HEISER ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE (1996).
47. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
48. Id. at 916.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 918.
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Noting that the Internet is a new technology, the court stated that “the
rules governing the protection of property rights, and how that protection
may be enforced under the new technology, need not be.”52 According
to the court, the United States Supreme Court provided “sufficient
guidance”53 in Calder v. Jones.54
In Calder, the Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction
despite the defendants’ apparent lack of contact with the forum state.55
The case involved allegations of libel premised on an article that was
written entirely in another state. Analyzing the personal jurisdiction
issue, the Court stated:
In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ The plaintiff’s lack of
‘contacts’ will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so
manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence.
Here, the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the
suit arises.
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a
California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose
television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from
California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s
emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the
harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California
based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.56

The Pavlovich court’s reliance on Calder was misplaced. Admittedly,
Calder involved a factual situation that, at first blush, appears
remarkably similar to the case at hand. However, the court overlooked a
crucial distinction—in Calder, the defendants had contacts with
California that were separate and distinct from the harmful effects
suffered by the plaintiff.57 For example, the reporter who wrote the
52. Id. at 912–13.
53. Id.
54. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). It is interesting to note that the Pavlovich court began its
opinion not by offering a traditional analysis of personal jurisdiction, but instead by
attempting to analogize to a similar case where jurisdiction was found.
55. Id. at 789. The case involved a suit for libel by Shirley Jones against a reporter
and editor of the National Enquirer. Id. at 784–86. Jones alleged that she had been
libeled in an article written and edited entirely in Florida. See id. at 785–86. The Court
stated that despite the defendants’ lack of contacts with California, jurisdiction was
“proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id. at
789. The Court went on to hold that jurisdiction was proper “because . . . [defendants’]
intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury to respondent in
California.” Id. at 791. This test has become known as the “Calder effects test.”
56. Id. at 788–89 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The
Court went on to stress the fact that the plaintiff was the focus of the libel. See id. at
789–90.
57. See id. at 785–86. For example, the reporter who wrote the article frequently
traveled to California on business, called sources in California for information on Jones,
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article frequently traveled to California on business, called sources in
California for information regarding the plaintiff, and phoned the
husband of the plaintiff in California to elicit his comments about the
article prior to publication.58 And as the Court noted, “[t]he article was
drawn from California sources.”59 One might argue that the wrongful
act itself—the libel—was premised entirely on the contacts with those
California sources. In light of this, it is understandable that the Court
found the exercise of jurisdiction permissible.
In the case at hand, however, Pavlovich’s wrongful conduct was in no
way premised on contacts with California. In fact, Pavlovich had no
contact whatsoever with California, other than that stemming from the
harmful effects of his conduct.60
Second, in Calder, the Court emphasized the fact that the defendants’
wrongful conduct was specifically “aimed” at the plaintiff herself, a
California resident. The Court acknowledged the importance of this
factor when it stated that “the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the
defendants out of which the suit arises.”61 In the case at hand, Pavlovich’s
conduct was not aimed at DVD CCA; in fact, he was allegedly unaware
of the existence of DVD CCA,62 an obscure association formed by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and two other
somewhat obscure groups, the Business Software Alliance and the
Electronic Industries Alliance.63
Finally, the harmful effects in Calder were actually felt by the
California plaintiff in California. In the case at hand, the harmful effects
to which the court alludes64 were felt not by DVD CCA, but by the
motion picture and computer industries—two amorphous and ill-defined
groups, as opposed to a specific, identifiable person as in Calder—that
and phoned the husband of the plaintiff in California to elicit his comments about the
article prior to publication. Id. As the Court noted, the article itself was drawn from
California sources. Id. at 788. One may draw the conclusion that but for the defendants’
telephone conversations with sources in California, the article could not have been
written. See id. at 785.
58. Id. at 785–86.
59. Id. at 788.
60. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
61. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788.
62. Points and Authorities, supra note 37.
63. AOL Legal Dep’t, Decisions & Litigation: Intellectual Property: DVD Copy
Control Association, Inc. v. McLaughlin, et al., at http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip
/DVDCCA.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
64. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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were not even party to the suit. In short, Pavlovich does not involve the
same caliber of activities as those present in Calder.
Perhaps realizing the inanity of its Calder analysis, the Pavlovich
court seemed to abruptly shift gears in the middle of its opinion and
focused on personal jurisdiction analysis. The court began by noting the
breadth of the California long-arm statute, and by acknowledging that
due process requires minimum contacts and reasonableness.65 According to
the court, where a court seeks to exercise specific jurisdiction, minimum
contacts are satisfied where the defendant purposefully avails himself of
forum benefits and where the suit is related to or arises out of the
contacts.66 Admittedly, it is difficult to find fault with the analytic
structure set forth by the court.67 What is problematic is the way in
which the court used that structure to reach its conclusion.
Perhaps what is most disturbing about the case is the court’s
willingness to find purposeful availment. Presumably, the court based
its finding on the effects test of Calder.68 Citing a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals case, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,69 the court
stated that “the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied where a
65. See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913 (Ct. App. 2001).
66. Id.
67. As previously stated, exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible where the
following three requirements are met: (1) the defendant must have purposefully directed
his activities at the forum or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum, (2) the suit must arise out of or relate to those activities, and (3)
the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. See supra notes 21–30 and
accompanying text. Thus, in the case at hand, California’s exercise of jurisdiction is
permissible: (1) if Matthew Pavlovich purposefully directed his activities at California,
(2) if the cause of action arose out of or is related to his contacts with California, and (3)
if exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
68. While one might presume that the court is relying on the effects test, it never
states that it is doing so and does not cite Calder. See Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909.
69. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). In Panavision, the plaintiff, owner of the
trademarks to “Panavision” and “Panaflex,” sued Toeppen, a resident of Illinois, for
trademark infringement for using the names “Panavision.com” and “Panaflex.com” as
Web addresses. See id. at 1319. When Panavision protested to Toeppen, he offered to
stop using the names if Panavision would pay him $13,000. Id. Panavision refused and
brought suit in a federal district court in California. Id. Toeppen objected to jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction was permissible and stated:
Under Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon, ‘(1) intentional actions
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is
suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered—in the
forum state.’
. . . Toeppen purposefully registered Panavision’s trademarks as his
domain names on the Internet to force Panavision to pay him money. The
brunt of the harm to Panavision was felt in California. Toeppen knew
Panavision would likely suffer harm there because . . . its principal place of
business was in California, and the heart of the theatrical motion picture and
television industry is located there.
Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
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defendant’s intentional conduct causes harmful effects within the
state.”70 The Pavlovich court not only incorrectly construed Panavision,71
but also erroneously applied the Calder effects test.
The court myopically focused entirely on Pavlovich’s “intentional”
conduct, and the harmful effects stemming from it. However, even if
one were to concede that Pavlovich’s conduct was indeed intentional and
that it did indeed cause harm within California, the exercise of
jurisdiction is still impermissible. Merely causing an effect within the
forum state does not, on its own, satisfy purposeful availment.72
Both Calder and Panavision recognize that, in addition to causing an
effect, the defendant must also have aimed his contacts at the forum
state.73 The Pavlovich court did not address this factor. If the court
were to do so, it might have to concede that Pavlovich never expressly
aimed his conduct at the forum and that, consequently, there was no
purposeful availment. As previously stated, Pavlovich did not aim his
conduct at DVD CCA; all he did was upload DeCSS to the Internet. As
recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Panavision, simply putting something
on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to suit
in the forum.74 “There must be ‘something more’ to demonstrate that the
defendant directed his activity toward the forum state.”75 In the case at
hand, the “something more” is simply missing.
Indeed, under the Pavlovich court’s formulation, California could
exercise jurisdiction over anyone, anywhere, who posted something on
70. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P., 141 F.3d
1316 at 1321).
71. The court in Panavision stated that “under Calder, personal jurisdiction can be
based upon: ‘(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing
harm, the brunt of which is suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be
suffered—in the forum state.’” Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Core-Vent Corp.
v. Novel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)). The court in Pavlovich
seemingly ignores Calder’s second criteria: that actions be “expressly aimed” at the forum.
72. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (stating that “the mere fact that
[the defendants] can ‘foresee’ that the article will . . . have an effect in California is not
sufficient for an assertion of jurisdiction” and noting that the “intentional, and allegedly
tortious, actions [of the defendants] were expressly aimed at California”); GTE New
Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (refusing to
exercise jurisdiction where defendant did not expressly aim his activities at the forum
state); Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321; Edmunds v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281,
287 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that merely causing an effect “is not necessarily sufficient
to afford a constitutional basis for jurisdiction”).
73. See supra notes 59, 67–69 and accompanying text.
74. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
75. Id. (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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the Internet, provided that they had some vague notion that harmful
effects would be caused in California. For example, an Internet user in
Timbuktu posting a defamatory remark about a movie actor on a bulletin
board might be haled into a California court and required to defend
against a defamation of character suit. Surely, this kind of limitless
jurisdictional power was not and has never been envisioned by the
Supreme Court as valid.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Internet becomes more pervasive, issues of personal
jurisdiction will have to be addressed. As this case illustrates, a
defendant using the Internet may have no contact whatsoever with the
forum state, other than the impact of his behavior, yet may still be
required to defend a suit there. Courts may be tempted to circumvent the
requirement of minimum contacts in order to protect the rights of
residents. This case presents an opportunity for the California Supreme
Court to address this situation and to formulate appropriate guidelines.76
TRACEY ANGELOPOULOS

76. On December 12, 2001 the California Supreme Court granted review of the Sixth
District Court of Appeal’s decision. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001).
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